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Financing of the activities arising from Security Council resolution 1863 (2009)

Financing of support of the African Union Mission in Somalia for the period from 1 July 2010 to 30 June 2011

Report of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions

Appropriation 2009/10	$213,580,000
Projected expenditure 2009/10*	$162,844,300
Estimated underexpenditure for 2009/10*	$50,735,700
Proposal submitted by the Secretary-General for 2010/11	$205,221,300
Recommendation of the Advisory Committee for 2010/11	$182,504,770

* Estimates as at 31 March 2010 (see annex I)

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I. Introduction

1. **The recommendations of the Advisory Committee in paragraphs 26 and 48 below would entail a reduction of $22,716,530 in the proposed budget for the financing of support of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) for the period from 1 July 2010 to 30 June 2011.**

2. The Advisory Committee's general report on the administrative and budgetary aspects of the financing of United Nations peacekeeping operations (A/64/660) contains its views and recommendations on a number of cross-cutting issues. Consequently, in the present report, the Committee deals with resources and other items specifically relating to the financing of support of AMISOM.

3. In considering the Secretary-General's proposals for the period from 1 July 2010 to 30 June 2011, the Advisory Committee has taken into account the recommendations of the Board of Auditors related to the Operation (see A/64/5 (Vol. II), chap. II) and made specific comments thereon, where relevant, in the present report. The Committee's report on the report of the Board of Auditors on United Nations peacekeeping operations is contained in document A/64/708. **The Committee reiterates the need for the expeditious implementation of the relevant recommendations of oversight bodies.**

4. The documents reviewed and used for background by the Advisory Committee in its consideration of the financing of support of AMISOM are listed at the end of the present report.

II. Financial position and information on performance for the current period

5. The Advisory Committee was informed that, as at 28 February 2010, a total of $291,371,000 had been assessed on Member States in respect of United Nations support of AMISOM since its inception. Payments received as at the same date amounted to $172,100,000, leaving an outstanding balance of $119,271,000. As at 28 February 2010, the cash available amounted to $131,000,000.

6. The Advisory Committee was also informed that, as at 31 March 2010, the incumbency for United Nations support of AMISOM for the period from 1 July 2009 to 30 June 2010 was as follows:

	Authorized	*Encumbered*	*Vacancy rate (percentage)*
AMISOM personnel			
Military contingents	8 000	6 120	23.5
Police	270	34	87.4
United Nations Support Office for AMISOM posts			
International	142	60	57.7
National	98	44	55.1

	Authorized	Encumbered	Vacancy rate (percentage)
General temporary assistance staff			
United Nations Support Office for AMISOM			
International	10	6	40
National	1	1	—
United Nations planning team			
International	14	9	35.7
National	5	4	20
Somalia coordination and planning team			
International	10	2	80
National	1	1	—
United Nations Headquarters			
International	4	2	50
National	1	1	—

[a] Represents the highest authorized strength for the period.

7. The Advisory Committee was provided with a table showing current and projected expenditures for the period from 1 July 2009 to 30 June 2010 (see annex I). Expenditures for the period as at 31 March 2010 amounted to $102,928,000. At the end of the current financial period, the estimated total expenditures would amount to $162,844,300 against the apportionment of $213,580,000, resulting in a projected unencumbered balance of $50,735,700.

8. The Advisory Committee's comments in connection with current expenditures are provided, as applicable.

III. Proposed budget for the period from 1 July 2010 to 30 June 2011

A. Mandate and planned results

9. By its resolution 1910 (2010), the Security Council decided to authorize the States members of the African Union to maintain AMISOM until 31 January 2011 to carry out its existing mandate, as set out in Council resolution 1772 (2007). The Council requested the Secretary-General to implement an incremental approach to the deployment of a United Nations peacekeeping operation in Somalia whereby the United Nations would continue to provide support to AMISOM and support for building the capacity of Somali institutions, while continuing to plan for the deployment of a United Nations peacekeeping operation at the appropriate time (see S/2009/210, paras. 82-86). The Council further requested the Secretary-General to continue to provide a logistical support package for AMISOM, comprising equipment and services, including public information support, but not including the transfer of funds to AMISOM until 31 January 2011 and to continue to provide

technical and expert advice to the African Union in the planning and deployment of AMISOM through the existing United Nations planning team in Addis Ababa.

10. The Secretary-General indicates that the human resources contained in the proposed budget comprise only support and planning personnel and are limited to the provision of logistical, planning and operational support for AMISOM under its existing mandate. Logistical support for AMISOM would be provided by the United Nations Support Office for AMISOM (UNSOA) in Nairobi, along with a support and transit base in Mombasa, Kenya (see paras. 52-54 below). Furthermore, as noted in paragraphs 49 and 50 below, UNSOA provides administrative support to the United Nations Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS), whose mandate is to advance the political process in Somalia and coordinate activities of the United Nations in the field. The United Nations planning team in Addis Ababa would continue to provide technical and expert advice to the African Union in the planning and deployment of AMISOM.

Security situation

11. In his periodic report to the Security Council, the Secretary-General indicates that insecurity remained widespread throughout Somalia (S/2009/684, paras. 16-20). The Advisory Committee was informed that no UNSOA staff were currently located in Mogadishu owing to security concerns. Staff visits had temporarily ceased following the attack on 17 September 2009 against AMISOM (see A/64/509, para. 13) but have been reinstated, with 30 staff visiting Mogadishu between 1 July 2009 and 13 April 2010.

United Nations Trust Fund in Support of the African Union Mission in Somalia

12. Upon enquiry, the Advisory Committee was informed that bilateral support to AMISOM was provided: (a) directly to the African Union/AMISOM, and (b) indirectly through the United Nations Trust Fund in Support of AMISOM. Direct bilateral support to, following the Brussels pledge conference held in April 2009, was expected to continue in the form of cash contributions and in kind contributions, mainly for the movement of troops and contingent-owned equipment. Furthermore, the Trust Fund had received contributions as at 23 February 2010 as follows:

Donor	Amount (United States dollars)
Australia	383 400
Czech Republic	150 000
Japan	9 000 000
Republic of Korea	500 000
Malta	13 293
Turkey	500 000
United Kingdom	14 515 000
Germany	3 646 700
Total	**28 708 393**

In 2009, $7.6 million was expended for Trust Fund activities, mainly in support of the AMISOM public information strategy and for the reimbursement of non-lethal contingent-owned equipment.

B. Resource requirements

13. The proposed budget for United Nations support of AMISOM for 2010/11 amounts to $205,221,300, representing a decrease of $8,358,700, or 3.9 per cent, in gross terms, compared with the total apportionment of $213,580,000 for 2009/10. The decrease is due to lower requirements for military and police personnel ($8,747,300) and operational costs ($39,200), offset by additional requirements for civilian personnel ($427,800). The proposed budget comprises, in gross terms, resources in the amount of $173,691,800 for the support provided to AMISOM, $27,531,500 for UNSOA, and $3,998,000 for the United Nations planning team (see also annex II). An analysis of variances is provided in paragraphs 84 to 101 of the proposed budget (A/64/644).

14. The proposed budget provides for the deployment of 160 international staff (including 14 temporary positions) and 109 national staff (including 5 temporary positions) to support an authorized strength of 8,000 military personnel and 270 police officers of AMISOM. A net decrease of 11 posts (4 per cent) is proposed.

1. Military and police personnel

Category	Proposed 2010/11	Actual (as at 31 March 2010)
AMISOM military contingent personnel[a]	8 000	6 120
AMISOM police[b]	270	34[c]

[a] Represents the highest authorized strength for the period. The Security Council, in resolutions 1872 (2009) and 1910 (2010), requested the Secretary-General to provide a logistical support package for AMISOM troops and police. There has been no change in the authorized strength of AMISOM since the previous period (see S/2009/684).

[b] AMISOM is expected to begin deployment of its civilian police to Mogadishu, subject to security conditions (see A/64/644, para. 28).

15. The proposed budget for support of the AMISOM military contingent and police personnel for the period from 1 July 2010 to 30 June 2011 amounts to $31,756,200, a decrease of $8,747,300 (21.6 per cent) compared to the apportionment of $40,503,500 for 2009/10. The decrease comprises lower requirements in the amount of $8,576,400 for military personnel and $170,900 for police personnel. The reduced requirements are attributable mainly to the fact that contingent-owned equipment for only one new battalion will be deployed in 2010/11 in comparison with equipment for eight battalions in 2009/10.

16. The estimate for 2010/11 of $31,756,200 comprises an amount of $31,461,400 for AMISOM military contingents and an amount of $294,800 for AMISOM police personnel. For AMISOM military contingent personnel, an amount of $6,322,100 is estimated for the emplacement of the new battalion and the rotation of the eight deployed battalions; $21,188,900 for the provision of food rations; and $3,950,400 for freight and the deployment of contingent-owned equipment for the new battalion (see also para. 18 below). For AMISOM police, an amount of $270,800 is estimated for travel and $24,000 for rations.

17. As at 31 March 2010, the actual vacancy rates during the current period were 23.5 per cent for military contingent personnel and 87.4 per cent for AMISOM police. For the 2010/11 period, a delayed deployment factor of 10 per cent is applied for AMISOM military contingents and 30 per cent for AMISOM police. It is further indicated in the proposed budget that, owing to the security situation, AMISOM police personnel are not expected to be deployed in Mogadishu as envisaged in 2009/10, while the estimated requirements for 2010/11 provide for their phased deployment.

18. With regard to the military deployment during the current period, the Advisory Committee was informed, upon enquiry, that UNSOA had assumed the deployment of two additional battalions before 30 June 2010, one in March and one in June. The Committee was informed that the battalion expected to arrive in March had deployed as planned, bringing the number of AMISOM military personnel to 6,120. While planning for the battalion expected to arrive in June is ongoing, delays may result in the battalion's emplacement during the budget period 2010/11. As long as the procurement process to outfit this battalion is completed by May, it would be able to deploy in June. The net financial implications of emplacing one battalion, including the movement of contingent-owned equipment, is estimated at approximately $4 million. The Committee was informed that, therefore, a delay in the deployment of the battalion expected to arrive in June would result in an underexpenditure of approximately $4 million for the period 2009/10, while the proposed budget for 2010/11 would experience an overexpenditure of that amount.

19. The Advisory Committee notes that total resources for military contingents for the period 2009/10 amount to $40,037,800. However, total projected expenditures for the current period are expected to amount to $26,996,400, leaving an unencumbered balance of $13,041,400, due mainly to the AMISOM contingent emplacement and rotation envisaged through the support of a bilateral donor, lower provisions for rations in line with the delayed deployment factor and lower overall costs for rations. Total resources for AMISOM police for the current period amount to $465,700, with total projected expenditures expected to amount to $47,400, leaving an unencumbered balance of $418,300, since fewer AMISOM police than planned are expected to be deployed in the current period owing to the security situation (see also annex I).

2. Civilian personnel

Category[a]	Approved 2009/10	Proposed 2010/11	Variance
International staff	142	146	4
National staff[b]	98	104	6
General temporary assistance	40	19[c]	(21)
Total	**280**	**269**	**(11)**

[a] Represents the highest level of authorized/proposed strength.

[b] Includes National Officers and national General Service staff.

[c] The period 2009/10 included 10 temporary staff for the headquarters planning team that are now proposed in the support account for 2010/11. Five positions from the recruitment cell and two positions from the Mombasa project team have been abolished. Four Resident Auditor positions in the Office of Internal Oversight Services are proposed to be funded from the support account for 2010/11.

20. The proposed budget for civilian personnel for the period from 1 July 2010 to 30 June 2011 amounts to $22,660,900, an increase of $427,800, or 1.9 per cent, compared to the apportionment for 2009/10. A delayed recruitment factor of 40 per cent has been applied to cost estimates for international staff, national General Service staff and National Professional Officers. For the period 2009/10, a delayed recruitment factor of 30 per cent was applied to international staff and 20 per cent to both national staff categories (see A/64/509, para. 28). The Advisory Committee notes from the incumbency table in paragraph 6 above that as at 31 March 2010, the vacancy rate was 57.7 per cent for international staff and 55.1 per cent for national staff, and therefore in both cases was well above the delayed recruitment factors for the current period. In this connection, the Committee was informed upon enquiry that, as at 8 April 2010, of the 16 UNSOA section and service chief posts (1 D-2, 3 D-1, 11 P-5 and 1 P-4), 15 posts had been filled, and the final case had been approved by the Field Central Review Board for selection.

21. The Advisory Committee was informed by UNSOA that the operation had experienced considerable difficulty in the recruitment and retention of staff and that many candidates had declined offers. UNSOA attributes those difficulties to the uncertainty regarding its future deployment to Somalia, as well as its classification as a non-family mission.

22. Moreover, the Advisory Committee notes the difference in the conditions of service between the staff of the UNSOA and those of the other United Nations staff located in Nairobi because of the designation of UNSOA as a non-family mission. The Committee is concerned that the Secretary-General has not addressed this issue. It continues to believe that conditions on the ground should be the decisive factor in the designation of a mission as family or non-family. The Committee will address this matter in the context of its general report on the administrative and budgetary aspects of the financing of United Nations peacekeeping operations (A/64/660).

23. The Advisory Committee was further informed that the turnover rate was high and that, of an average international staff strength of 41, 49 international staff had left UNSOA since July 2009. As a result, UNSOA has hired temporary duty staff and short-term individual contractors. **The Committee is concerned about the difficulties many missions, including UNSOA, encounter in recruiting and retaining staff, and about the high turnover rate. It intends to comment on these issues in its general report on peacekeeping operations.**

24. Increased resource requirements related to civilian personnel are attributable to:

(a) Salaries for international staff ($7,991,000) and for national staff ($2,110,300) as a result of the planned full deployment of staff and the delayed recruitment factor of 40 per cent, as well as related common staff costs ($5,376,400 and $1,247,000, respectively) pursuant to the adoption by the General Assembly in its resolution 63/250 of new contractual arrangements under one set of staff rules effective 1 July 2009;

(b) General temporary assistance costs ($3,412,800, representing a reduction of $3,704,300, or 52 per cent, from 2009/10) resulting from the lower number of proposed positions for 2010/11 following the abolishment of 7 positions and the proposed funding of 14 positions from the support account for the period 2010/11 (see table preceding para. 20).

Recommendations on posts

25. A summary of the proposed changes in staffing is presented in annex III to the present report. As indicated in the table preceding in paragraph 20, there is a net decrease in the proposed staffing level by 11 posts and positions, reflecting the proposed establishment of 10 new posts, offset by the proposed funding in the support account of 10 temporary positions in the headquarters planning teams and the proposed abolishment of 11 positions funded under general temporary assistance.

26. It is indicated in paragraph 49 of the proposed budget that a P-3 Planning Officer is proposed in the Office of the Director. The Planning Officer would work under the supervision of the Senior Administrative Officer and would, inter alia, analyse business processes and standardize data management and internal reporting procedures, provide management advice to the sections on cross-cutting performance management, monitoring and improvement initiatives and document UNSOA best practices. The Advisory Committee notes that the immediate Office of the Director currently comprises 11 posts (1 D-2, 2 P-5, 1 P-4, 2 P-3, 1 Field Service and 4 national General Service posts). **Bearing in mind the vacancy rate of 57.7 per cent for international staff (see para. 6 above), as well as the planning and analytical expertise already available through UNSOA and the planning team, the Committee recommends that the function be accommodated from within existing capacity. The Committee recommends that, with the exception of the proposed establishment of one P-3 Planning Officer in the Office of the Director, all other staffing proposals of the Secretary-General be approved.**

27. **The Advisory Committee reiterates its recommendations that: (a) a prudent approach to the hiring of national staff at present locations is necessary since it is intended that the operation be relocated to Somalia; and (b) a staffing plan be developed to ensure a smooth transition should the Security Council decide to establish a peacekeeping mission in Somalia (see A/64/509, para. 38).**

3. Operational costs

(United States dollars)

Appropriation 2009/10	*Proposed 2010/11*	*Variance*
150 843 400	150 804 200	(39 200)

28. The estimated operational requirements for the period from 1 July 2010 to 30 June 2011 reflect a decrease of $39,200 in comparison with the appropriation for 2009/10. The Advisory Committee provides its observations and recommendations on operational requirements in paragraph 48 below.

Official travel

29. Official travel expenditures for the current period, as at 31 March 2010, are projected at $3,037,800, resulting in a projected overexpenditure of $700,700 (30 per cent) owing to greater requirements for operational travel in the start-up phase, as well as for monthly subsistence allowance for temporary duty personnel (see annex I).

30. Estimated requirements for official travel for the period 2010/11 total $1,173,100, a decrease of $1,164,000 (49.8 per cent) compared to the apportionment for 2009/10. As noted in the budget document, the reduced requirements are attributable primarily to: (a) a reduction in commercial flights, as UNSOA will increasingly rely on its air assets or its third-party logistics contract to support travel requirements (see also paras. 39-41 below); (b) lower requirements for staff members on temporary assignment from other peacekeeping missions and Headquarters due to an expected higher level of deployment of authorized personnel; and (c) the proposed funding change-over of the headquarters planning team staff to the support account for peacekeeping operations for 2010/11.

Facilities and infrastructure

31. Expenditures for the period 2009/10, as at 31 March 2010, are projected at $65,426,100, with a projected unencumbered balance in the amount of $12,975,100 (16.5 per cent) due to: (a) a delay in the construction of the temporary force headquarters and the level II hospital and distribution logistics base at Mogadishu airport owing to the security situation; and (b) a delay in the construction of the Mombasa support base owing to ongoing negotiations with Government authorities, partially offset by higher costs for camp construction because of construction delays (see annex I).

32. Estimated requirements for facilities and infrastructure for 2010/11 total $75,062,700, a decrease of $3,338,500 (4.3 per cent) compared to the apportionment for 2009/10. The Advisory Committee was informed that the estimate for 2010/11 was lower because key infrastructure items and supplies, including generators, refrigeration units, catering equipment and sanitation systems, were acquired in 2008/09 and 2009/10. Furthermore, those assets would be used to upgrade infrastructure in Mogadishu and were part of the UNSOA two-year construction programme. In this connection, six camps were planned to be completed in 2009/10, with an additional three to be completed by 30 June 2011; all camps would be located in or near Mogadishu.

33. The estimate for 2010/11 includes $36,820,000 under construction services, representing a decrease of $4,917,000 (11.8 per cent) compared to 2009/10. Upon enquiry, the Advisory Committee was provided with an update of the two-year UNSOA construction plan and the following table summarizing all planned projects budgeted for in 2009/10:

Planned projects	*Status*	*Budget (United States dollars)*
Construction of six camps	Being constructed in 2009/10	32 760 000
Permanent force headquarters/level II hospital	Being constructed in 2009/10	4 351 000
UNSOA headquarters in Nairobi	Being constructed in 2009/10	120 000
Contractor to build prefabricated camps	Being constructed in 2009/10	2 500 000
Temporary force headquarters/level II hospital	Not being constructed in 2009/10 or 2010/11	10 134 000
Mogadishu airport distribution site	Not being constructed in 2009/10 or 2010/11	990 000
Mombasa support base	Pending negotiations with Government authorities	1 710 000
	30 per cent delayed implementation factor for camps	(9 828 000)
	Reduction by the General Assembly (0.5 per cent)	(1 000 000)
Total construction services in 2009/10		**41 737 000**

34. Upon enquiry, the Advisory Committee was informed that major construction activities in Mogadishu, budgeted for in 2009/10, were expected to be completed by 31 March 2011, including, as noted in the table above, a permanent force headquarters and a level II hospital; three permanent and three prefabricated camp accommodations and related facilities; perimeter defence and gate-control mechanisms; bore wells; water treatment plants; and wastewater treatment plants. Significant projects that were not pursued in 2009/10 include the temporary force headquarters, the full project at the Mombasa support base and construction at Mogadishu airport. The Committee was further informed that the related underexpenditure would be offset mainly by the higher than planned expenditure for contractors for the construction of prefabricated facilities.

35. With regard to major construction activities for 2010/11, the Advisory Committee was informed that the following projects would be completed by 30 September 2011: (a) construction of permanent living accommodations for one battalion (850 troops); (b) construction of prefabricated accommodations and related facilities for two battalions (1,700 troops); and (c) construction of a perimeter defence for nine battalion camps, for the permanent force headquarters and for the level II hospital. **The Committee believes that a prudent approach for these construction activities is required and trusts that, given the circumstances on the ground, all such activities are carefully monitored.**

Ground transportation

36. Expenditures for the period 2009/10, as at 31 March 2010, are projected at $9,194,900, resulting in a projected unencumbered balance in the amount of $6,465,100 (41.3 per cent) as a result of lower requirements for airfield equipment intended for Mogadishu that was not acquired, as air movement was provided by a third-party contractor; for vehicles and vans; and for petrol, oil and lubricants (see annex I).

37. Upon enquiry, the Advisory Committee was informed that, as at 12 April 2010, UNSOA had procured and received 121 vehicles; 50 had been delivered to Mogadishu, 28 to Nairobi, 1 to Entebbe, Uganda, and 42 to Mombasa. Furthermore, 18 vehicles had been procured and were in transit, 48 were in the procurement process and 6 vehicles were to be procured using resources allocated in 2010/11.

The 193 vehicles planned for UNSOA would be positioned as follows: 127 in Mogadishu; 33 in Mombasa; and 33 in Nairobi.

38. Estimated requirements for ground transportation for the period 2010/11 total $9,527,300, a decrease of $6,132,700 (39.2 per cent) compared to the apportionment for 2009/10, attributable mainly to the acquisition of required vehicles in 2008/09 and 2009/10. It is also indicated in the budget document that these lower requirements are partially offset by increased requirements for petrol, oil and lubricants owing to the projected increase in the consumption of vehicle fuel, estimated at 4.4 million litres for 2010/11 as compared with 3.6 million litres budgeted in 2009/10. The anticipated increased fuel consumption is based on the deployment of UNSOA and AMISOM personnel in 2010/11.

Air transportation

39. Expenditures for the period 2009/10, as at 31 March 2010, are projected at $376,800 resulting in a projected unencumbered balance in the amount of $4,087,400 (91.6 per cent) due to: (a) the inability of UNSOA, for security reasons, to procure a dedicated United Nations aircraft; and (b) the contracting of charter aircraft pending the establishment of the third-party logistics contract in April 2010 (see annex I).

40. The Advisory Committee was informed by UNSOA that a further delay was anticipated in the process of evaluating the bids received in its solicitation exercise for a long-term third-party contractor for the movement of cargo and passengers owing to a shortage of that specific aircraft type, but that the aircraft was still required for situations in which commercial contractors may be unwilling to travel to Mogadishu. Upon enquiry, the Committee was informed that, by contracting locally available aircraft, a total of 38 flights (10 medical evacuation flights and 28 other flights) have taken place in support of UNSOA, UNPOS and AMISOM. The Committee was also informed that, based on 1,000 flight hours, used as the benchmark for United Nations contracts for such aircraft, the cost differential compared to a third-party commercial contractor would be approximately $3 million per annum.

41. Estimated requirements for air transportation for the period 2010/11 total $13,066,100, an increase of $8,601,900 (192.7 per cent) compared to the apportionment for 2009/10, attributable mainly to increased requirements for the rental and operation of one fixed-wing aircraft and for petrol, oil and lubricants for 1,000 fixed-wing flight hours as compared to 370 flight hours in 2009/10.

Communications

42. Expenditures for the period 2009/10, as at 31 March 2010, are projected at $12,176,700, resulting in a projected unencumbered balance in the amount of $270,400 (2.2 per cent). Estimated requirements for communications for the period 2010/11 total $16,490,800, an increase of $4,043,700 (32.5 per cent) compared to the apportionment for 2009/10. It is indicated in the proposed budget that the increased requirement is attributable mainly to the provision for the second phase of a three-year project supporting AMISOM in the implementation of its communications strategy through public information support operations, including but not limited to the establishment of a radio station with the ability to provide short-wave and FM national coverage broadcasts. The increased requirements are also attributable to the provision for commercial communications to support the deployment of the operation's personnel and the establishment of its communications

infrastructure throughout Kenya and in Mogadishu. Those requirements are partially offset by major acquisitions of communications equipment to support AMISOM and UNSOA operations during the 2008/09 and 2009/10 periods.

43. The Advisory Committee notes that estimated requirements under communications include an amount of $8,244,800 for public information services, representing an increase of $6,243,900 (312.1 per cent) over the apportionment of $2,000,900 for 2009/10. Upon enquiry, the Committee received the following breakdown of the estimated requirements for 2010/11:

(United States dollars)

Description	*Funding requirements*
Internationally contracted broadcasting personnel	80 667
AMISOM information management project (phase II)	7 255 887
Research and analytical services	840 000
Rental of space for radio transmission towers	60 000
Total[a]	**8 236 554**

[a] Total estimated requirements under public information amount to $8,244,800, with an additional amount of $8,246 estimated for the United Nations planning team.

44. Upon enquiry, the Advisory Committee was informed that public information operations were managed under a joint African Union/United Nations information support team arrangement with the primary aim of: (a) implementing a communication strategy to obtain broad popular support and understanding of the role of AMISOM; and (b) enhancing AMISOM security and operational effectiveness in the Somali information environment. The information support team was mobilized in November 2009 and commenced operations in December 2009 in the areas of research; press media and outreach; production; and radio.

Medical

45. Expenditures for the period 2009/10, as at 31 March 2010, are projected at $2,859,400, resulting in a projected unencumbered balance in the amount of $878,200 (23.5 per cent) (see annex I). Estimated requirements for medical services and equipment for the period 2010/11 total $6,982,200, an increase of $3,244,600 (86.8 per cent) compared to the apportionment for 2009/10, attributable mainly to: (a) increased provisions for medical consumables and supplies to support one level I clinic per battalion and two level II hospitals in support of AMISOM in Mogadishu; (b) the higher deployment of military contingent personnel and civilian personnel as compared with the 2009/10 period; and (c) increased provisions for the medical evacuation of 50 AMISOM personnel. It is indicated in paragraph 20 of the proposed budget that UNSOA would continue to provide trauma training for AMISOM doctors, medical staff and soldiers to ensure that immediate trauma care is available to all AMISOM and UNSOA personnel in Mogadishu. UNSOA would continue to provide medical equipment and consumables for the AMISOM level I and II facilities and would maintain a level II facility for United Nations civilian staff operating in Mogadishu.

Other supplies, services and equipment

46. Expenditures for the period 2009/10, as at 31 March 2010, are projected at $21,541,900, resulting in a projected unencumbered balance in the amount of

$745,500 (3.3 per cent) (see annex I), owing mainly to delays in the construction of the Mombasa support base. Estimated requirements for other supplies, services and equipment for 2010/11 total $23,744,800, an increase of $1,457,400 (6.5 per cent) compared to the apportionment for 2009/10, attributable mainly to requirements for mine detection and mine-clearing services in the amount of $14,468,000, representing an increase of $4,248,700 (41.6 per cent) over 2009/10. Upon enquiry, the Advisory Committee was provided with the following breakdown of the requirements for 2010/11:

Description	*Amount (United States dollars)*
Personnel	**2 884 827**
Training	
Advanced explosive ordnance disposal training	2 473 000
Explosive ordnance disposal/improvised explosive device disposal training	528 000
Subtotal	**3 001 000**
Travel	**306 076**
Operating costs	
Equipment	
Explosive ordnance disposal equipment	337 610
Specialist explosive ordnance disposal/ improvised explosive device disposal equipment	1 935 570
Office equipment/furniture	316 700
Information technology equipment	152 200
Nairobi office equipment	332 000
Freight	307 408
Subtotal, equipment	**3 381 488**
Rent and office running costs	786 800
Aircraft charter	274 000
Mine-protected vehicle support	1 090 100
Supplies	130 200
Vehicle maintenance and fuel	138 000
Logistics/camp management/security	943 800
Explosives	80 000
Other administrative costs	360 000
Subtotal	**7 204 388**
Management fees and support costs	**1 071 703**
Total	**14 467 994**

47. Upon enquiry, the Advisory Committee was informed that, in 2010/11, the support of AMISOM provided by the Mine Action Service of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations would include: (a) training for AMISOM officers to manage and conduct explosive ordnance disposal activities; (b) advanced training,

mentorship and support to enable AMISOM to address explosive ordnance disposal threats and develop defensive countermeasures; and (c) procurement of necessary equipment and explosives. Furthermore, following the attack on AMISOM force headquarters on 17 September 2009 (see also A/64/509, paras. 13 and 14), the role of the Service would be expanded in 2010/11: (a) to support AMISOM in developing and managing a coordinated, comprehensive and effective improvised explosive device disposal response capacity; and (b) to provide explosive ordnance collection and disposal, survey and mine risk education to assist in areas where AMISOM cannot deploy or operate.

Recommendation on operational costs

48. The Advisory Committee notes that underexpenditure has averaged approximately 15 per cent since the inception of the operation (see annex IV). An unencumbered balance of $50,735,700 (23.8 per cent) is projected for the current period, comprising $13,459,700 (33.2 per cent) under military and police personnel; $8,269,600 (37.2 per cent) under civilian personnel; and $29,006,400 (19.2 per cent) under operational costs (see para. 13 above and annex I). **The Committee recognizes that the pattern of underexpenditure is primarily a result of circumstances beyond the operation's direct control and that the prevailing security situation in Mogadishu continues to prevent the deployment of staff and materiel. In view of these circumstances and the pattern of expenditure, the Committee recommends that the proposed budget for the period 2010/11 be reduced by 15 per cent, representing an amount of $22,620,630, to be applied under operational costs.**

IV. Other comments and observations

Organizational structure

49. The Advisory Committee recalls that, as a result of a review of the administrative functions of UNPOS and UNSOA, the latter assumed all the core administrative and budgetary functions of both entities as from 1 January 2010, while a number of administrative functions and services would be provided by the United Nations Office at Nairobi under a cost-sharing arrangement governed by a memorandum of understanding (see A/64/509, para. 60).

50. Upon enquiry, the Advisory Committee was informed that, as planned, UNSOA has assumed all of the core administrative functions of UNPOS with effect from 1 January 2010 and that a memorandum of understanding has been developed to formalize the support arrangement. The administrative services provided by UNSOA include: (a) human resources management support; (b) financial support, in close coordination with the UNPOS regional coordination unit; (c) procurement and contract management support; (d) internal and external audit-related support; and (e) support for UNPOS budget and trust fund activities. The Committee was further informed that the administrative support was limited to UNPOS operations in Nairobi and Mogadishu and did not extend to the planned regional offices in "Somaliland" and "Puntland". Also, UNSOA provides technical advice to UNPOS, including in information and communications technology, engineering, movement control and air operations. In this connection, the Committee was provided with the organization charts for UNSOA (one consolidated chart, one chart for UNSOA in

Nairobi and one for UNSOA in Mombasa) (see annex V) and UNPOS (see annex VI).

51. The Advisory Committee recalls its comments in its previous report (ibid., paras. 59-62) with regard to the overall organizational structure in support of the United Nations engagement in Somalia and the absorption of the administrative functions of UNPOS into UNSOA. **The Committee reiterates its concerns that the overall operational structure continues to be overly complex and bureaucratic, which creates problems in terms of coordination and accountability. The Committee recalls that it encouraged the Secretary-General to keep under review all activities and structures in connection with the United Nations presence in Somalia, and notes that efforts are under way, and thus requests the Secretary-General to report thereon in future UNSOA and UNPOS budget proposals. In addition, the Committee recalls the need for greater clarity of the integrative approach and of the interlinkages among the numerous United Nations and other entities involved in the overall support of Somalia, as well as clarity as to how this arrangement contributes to meeting the objectives set by the Security Council. The Committee in particular believes that, at this stage of the operation, it would be appropriate to develop benchmarks aimed at measuring the efficacy of United Nations support of AMISOM.**

Logistics support

52. The Advisory Committee was informed that the Mombasa support base was located in a commercial site with five leased warehouses, container storage and prefabricated office accommodation. The Committee was also informed that the Government of Kenya had provided vacant land adjacent to the Mombasa international airport for the construction by UNSOA of a dedicated support base. Currently Mombasa-related service and section chiefs, staff involved in direct support discussions with AMISOM and other partners and the majority of the administrative support functions are based in Nairobi (see also annex V). As noted in paragraph 32 of the budget document, the proposed staffing for 2010/11 includes additional posts for the support base in Mombasa, where approximately half of the UNSOA staffing complement is planned to be located. Upon enquiry, the Committee was informed that, as at 28 February 2010, the support base in Mombasa was staffed with 19 international staff, 6 national staff and 3 international contractors. **The Committee encourages UNSOA to develop a deployment plan based on the operational requirements to move staff to Mombasa.**

53. Furthermore, the Mombasa operation is intended to manage the supply, warehousing and logistics chain for movement from Mombasa to Mogadishu. With regard to UNSOA support of AMISOM, the Advisory Committee was informed upon enquiry that the primary supply methodology used by UNSOA had been by sea. Fifteen ships have been used to transport rations, general supplies, defensive stores, medical supplies, prefabricated facilities, material-handling and other assorted equipment and vehicles. The ships have been leased on a short-term contract that provides services from the Mombasa support base to the AMISOM airport camp in Mogadishu, where the AMISOM vehicle fleet moves cargo from port to door and vice versa. All vessels travelling between Mombasa and Mogadishu are accompanied by military naval escorts provided by the European Union. The Committee was also informed that UNSOA used air transportation between Entebbe

and Mogadishu during the initial start-up phase; however, since the activation of biweekly ship transports from Mombasa to Mogadishu, only a few aircraft have been used for emergency deliveries of rations, medical supplies and spare parts. Security concerns are the primary reason for not using aircraft, since the Mogadishu airport is routinely attacked with mortars and the airport facilities are limited to the UNSOA/AMISOM-provided firefighting team and equipment. Also, road transportation to Mogadishu through southern Somalia is currently not possible for security reasons and, furthermore, the road infrastructure is in very poor condition. The Committee was further informed that the Mombasa support base had to date handled 146 different commercial air and sea shipments. If required, the Mombasa warehouse facilities could be expanded. In connection with sea transport, the Committee notes that UNSOA entered into a service-level agreement with the World Food Programme as at 1 August 2009 for ocean freight arrangements for three shipments of rations between Mombasa and Mogadishu in the amount of $300,000 (see A/64/644, sect. V.B).

54. Regarding planned supply chain activities for 2010, the Advisory Committee was informed, upon enquiry, that the procurement case for a long-term freight-forwarding contract had been forwarded to the Procurement Division on 8 March 2010. This contract would include: sealift from Mombasa to Mogadishu and other Somali ports; airlift between Nairobi, Mombasa, Mogadishu, Entebbe and Bujumbura; and ground transportation within Kenya and to Entebbe and Bujumbura. The contract would include all custom requirements and material handling and also provide for door-to-door service across the UNSOA mission area. **The Committee requests that future budget submissions include information on the implementation of the aforementioned long-term freight-forwarding contract.**

Risk management and accountability

55. With regard to procurement and contract management, the Advisory Committee was informed, upon enquiry, that the security situation in Mogadishu and the need for remote management have had an impact on the procurement process and contract management. Security factors in Mogadishu narrow the availability of vendors and can add appreciable costs to contracted services. UNSOA therefore engages with potential vendors to improve their understanding of the procurement process, contract requirements and the prevailing security situation. Furthermore, to mitigate against the risks of substandard quality rations or delayed deliveries, UNSOA has instituted a best-value-for-money committee that reviews contractual actions and evaluates all compliant bids.

56. With regard to property control and related accountability, the Advisory Committee was informed that UNSOA presents unique circumstances that require some adaptation and strengthening of existing United Nations procedures. In particular: African Union military contingents operate, maintain and account for United Nations-owned assets; security conditions preclude United Nations staff presence in Mogadishu; remote management systems need to be employed; contractual inspection and verification services are required for accounting and equipment maintenance purposes; and the property management systems of the African Union and the United Nations have significant variances. The Committee was also informed that a memorandum of understanding between the African Union and the United Nations signed on 12 July 2009 defines the relationship between the two organizations, including the responsibilities and accountabilities for property

management. In addition, a support implementation agreement has been established between AMISOM and UNSOA to detail the procedural aspects for property control and accounting. In this connection, a contract for services related to the verification and inspection of property is to be in place by May 2010. In addition, a quality assurance programme is to be established for the monitoring of contractor performance and the performance of random inspections of AMISOM holdings of United Nations-owned property. The Committee was provided with a diagram showing the overall concept for the envisaged contractual services (see annex VII). **In view of the difficult internal control environment confronting UNSOA, the Committee is concerned that arrangements are not already in place to ensure the verification and inspection of United Nations-owned property and to monitor contractor performance.**

57. The Advisory Committee was informed that the evolving experience in delivering the support package to AMISOM indicates a need to further review the adequacy of the standard United Nations property control system and organizational structure. The Committee was further informed that, within UNSOA, nine sections or units currently exercise asset management responsibilities and that this standard arrangement adds complexity to the AMISOM client interface, inhibits consistency in policy and procedural practice and complicates the already challenging nature of remote management. As a result, UNSOA was reviewing the structure of the property management section and the various technical sections and the division of responsibility between them. Anticipated outcomes of the review would include: (a) the establishment of a single UNSOA focal point to process and advise AMISOM clients on property control and accounting; (b) a standardization of the UNSOA stockholding policy; (c) central monitoring and management of inventory levels and asset reporting; (d) central management of the contractual service for inspection and verification and the quality assurance programme; and (e) the establishment of a project management approach to ensure that asset transfers match actual needs. Upon enquiry, the Committee was informed that the review of the division of responsibilities was ongoing as at 12 April 2010 and that efforts were directed at ensuring compliance with the United Nations requirement for a physical inspection of all United Nations-owned equipment by 30 June 2010.

58. **The Advisory Committee requests that the Secretary-General provide an update on each of the above-noted five elements in the context of the budget submission for the period 2011/12, including the results of the review and action taken, as well as how the new arrangement has helped achieve compliance with United Nations property monitoring guidelines.**

V. Conclusion

59. The actions to be taken by the General Assembly in connection with the financing of United Nations support of AMISOM for the period from 1 July 2010 to 30 June 2011 are indicated in paragraph 102 of the proposed budget. **Subject to its observations and recommendations in paragraphs 26 and 48 above, the Advisory Committee recommends a reduction in the proposed budget of the Secretary-General in the amount of $22,716,530. The Committee therefore recommends that the Assembly appropriate an amount of $182,504,770 for financing support of the African Union Mission in Somalia for the period from 1 July 2010 to 30 June 2011.**

Documentation

- Financing of support of the African Union Mission in Somalia for the period from 1 July 2010 to 30 June 2011 (A/64/644)
- Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Somalia (S/2009/684)
- Report of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions on the financing of support of the African Union Mission in Somalia for the period from 1 July 2009 to 30 June 2010 (A/64/509)
- Security Council resolutions 1910 (2010), 1907 (2009) and 1897 (2009)
- General Assembly resolution 63/275 B

Annex I

Current and projected expenditure, support of the African Union Mission in Somalia, 1 July 2009 to 30 June 2010

(Thousands of United States dollars)

	1 July 2009 to 31 March 2010			*Projected to 30 June 2010*				
Category	*Apportionment* (1)	*Total expenditure* (2)	*Unencumbered balance* (3)=(1)-(2)	*Expenditure, 1 April-30 June* (4)	*Total expenditure* (5)=(2)+(4)	*Estimated unencumbered balance as at 30 June 2010* (6)=(1)-(5)	*Variance percentage* (7)=(6)÷(1)	*Reasons for variance*
Military and police personnel								
Military observers	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
Military contingents	40 037.8	23 246.4	16 791.4	3 750.0	26 996.4	13 041.4	32.6	Lower requirements are due mainly to the emplacement and rotation of AMISOM contingents, which are envisaged to be supported through a bilateral donor up to 31 March 2010. UNSOA will support the subsequent rotations of AMISOM contingents up to 30 June 2010. In addition, there is a lower provision for rations in line with the delayed deployment of AMISOM troops (average of 5,516 versus 6,400 budgeted)
African Union police	465.7	47.4	418.3	—	47.4	418.3	89.8	Owing to the security situation in Mogadishu, fewer African Union police than envisaged are expected to be deployed in the current period
Formed police units	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
Subtotal	**40 503.5**	**23 293.8**	**17 209.7**	**3 750.0**	**27 043.8**	**13 459.7**	**33.2**	
Civilian personnel								
International staff	12 479.9	5 792.2	6 687.7	1 930.7	7 722.9	4 757.0	38.1	Budget estimates provided for a higher average monthly deployment than was realized

Category	1 July 2009 to 31 March 2010			Projected to 30 June 2010				
	Apportionment	*Total expenditure*	*Unencumbered balance*	*Expenditure, 1 April-30 June*	*Total expenditure*	*Estimated unencumbered balance as at 30 June 2010*	*Variance percentage*	
	(1)	*(2)*	*(3)=(1)-(2)*	*(4)*	*(5)=(2)+(4)*	*(6)=(1)-(5)*	*(7)=(6)÷(1)*	*Reasons for variance*
National staff	2 636.1	640.6	1 995.5	969.7	1 610.3	1 025.8	38.9	Budget estimates provided for a higher average monthly deployment than was realized
United Nations Volunteers	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
General temporary assistance	7 117.1	3 353.4	3 763.7	1 276.9	4 630.3	2 486.8	34.9	Lower deployment for national and international staff
Subtotal	**22 233.1**	**9 786.2**	**12 446.9**	**4 177.3**	**13 963.5**	**8 269.6**	**37.2**	
Operational costs								
Government-provided personnel	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
Civilian electoral observers	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
Consultants	532.2	230.5	301.7	17.6	248.1	284.1	53.4	Lower requirements for consultants for training and information analysis
Official travel	2 337.1	1 951.0	386.1	1 086.8	3 037.8	(700.7)	(30.0)	Owing to the start-up phase of the operation, higher requirements for operational travel were incurred and owing to the delayed recruitment of personnel, more temporary duty personnel were deployed for whom UNSOA had to cover monthly subsistence allowance
Facilities and infrastructure	78 401.2	33 774.3	44 626.9	31 651.8	65 426.1	12 975.1	16.5	Temporary field headquarters/ level II hospital and distribution logistics base at Mogadishu airport were delayed indefinitely owing to the security situation; Mombasa support base was delayed owing to ongoing negotiations with Government authorities

Category	1 July 2009 to 31 March 2010			Projected to 30 June 2010				
	Apportionment	Total expenditure	Unencumbered balance	Expenditure 1 April-30 June	Total expenditure	Estimated unencumbered balance as at 30 June 2010	Variance percentage	
	(1)	(2)	(3)=(1)-(2)	(4)	(5)=(2)+(4)	(6)=(1)-(5)	(7)=(6)÷(1)	Reasons for variance
Ground transportation	15 660.0	4 918.5	10 741.5	4 276.4	9 194.9	6 465.1	41.3	Variance is due to several factors, including: airfield equipment intended for Mogadishu was not acquired as air movement was provided by third-party contractor, freight provision was overestimated and there were reduced requirements for vehicles, vans and petrol, oil and lubricants
Air transportation	4 464.2	352.5	4 111.7	24.3	376.8	4 087.4	91.6	Due to the inability to procure a dedicated United Nations aircraft for security reasons, UNSOA will not deploy the multi-role aircraft as envisaged; instead UNSOA is contracting charter aircraft to support its operation pending the establishment of the third-party logistics contract in April 2010
Naval transportation	1 231.1	375.3	855.8	135.3	510.6	720.5	58.5	Two of the six planned patrol boats will be procured during the period
Communications	12 447.1	11 816.1	631.0	360.6	12 176.7	270.4	2.2	Lower requirements are due to the inability to deploy communications consultants as envisaged owing to visa issues
Information technology	9 745.5	1 967.8	7 777.7	4 496.9	6 464.7	3 280.8	33.7	Lower requirements are due to the inability to deploy information technology consultants as envisaged owing to visa issues and potential delays in the procurement of information technology equipment due to possible limitations in the procurement process

Category	1 July 2009 to 31 March 2010			Projected to 30 June 2010				Reasons for variance
	Apportionment	Total expenditure	Unencumbered balance	Expenditure, 1 April-30 June	Total expenditure	Estimated unencumbered balance as at 30 June 2010	Variance percentage	
	(1)	(2)	(3)=(1)-(2)	(4)	(5)=(2)+(4)	(6)=(1)-(5)	(7)=(6)÷(1)	
Medical	3 737.6	2 859.4	878.2	—	2 859.4	878.2	23.5	Lower expenditures are foreseen for aero-medical evacuation owing to UNSOA contractual agreement with the African Medical and Research Foundation compared to budget, as well as no hospitalizations envisaged subsequent to mass evacuation in the first half of 2010
Special equipment	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
Other supplies, services and equipment	22 287.4	11 602.6	10 684.8	9 939.3	21 541.9	745.5	3.3	Delays in the construction of the Mombasa support base have prevented the procurement of "other equipment" required to support the base, as the temporary leased warehouses are fully equipped and a reduction in sealift and airlift of United Nations-owned assets from strategic deployment stocks is anticipated, as less equipment is envisaged to be provided by the United Nations Logistics Base at Brindisi, Italy
Quick-impact projects	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
Subtotal	**150 843.4**	**69 848.0**	**80 995.4**	**51 989.0**	**121 837.0**	**29 006.4**	**19.2**	
Gross requirements	**213 580.0**	**102 928.0**	**110 652.0**	**59 916.3**	**162 844.3**	**50 735.7**	**23.8**	
Staff assessment income	2 358.7	1 248.2	1 110.5	1 110.5	2 358.7	—	—	
Net requirements	**211 221.3**	**101 679.8**	**109 541.5**	**58 805.8**	**160 485.6**	**50 735.7**	**24.0**	
Voluntary contributions in kind (budgeted)	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
Total	**213 580.0**	**102 928.0**	**110 652.0**	**59 916.3**	**162 844.3**	**50 735.7**	**23.8**	

Annex II

Summary of financial resources by category, 1 July 2010 to 30 June 2011

(Thousands of United States dollars, rounded)

	Cost estimates					*Comments*	
Category	*Total*	*AMISOM*	*UNSOA*	*United Nations planning team*	*AMISOM percentage*	*AMISOM*	*UNSOA*
Military and police personnel							
Military observers	—	—	—	—	—		
Military contingents	31 461.4	31 461.4	—	—	100		
United Nations police	294.8	294.8	—	—	100		
Formed police units	—	—	—	—	—		
Subtotal	**31 756.2**	**31 756.2**	**—**	**—**	**100**	—	—
Civilian personnel							
International staff	15 329.2	—	15 329.2	—	—		
National staff	3 918.9	—	3 918.9	—	—		
United Nations Volunteers	—	—	—	—	—		
General temporary assistance	3 412.8	—	—	3 412.8	—		
Subtotal	**22 660.9**	**—**	**19 248.1**	**3 412.8**	**—**	—	—
Operational costs							
Government-provided personnel	—	—	—	—	—		
Civilian electoral observers	—	—	—	—	—		
Consultants	56.0	—	56.0	—	—		Training consultants for UNSOA staff
Official travel	1 173.1	—	928.8	244.3	—		UNSOA travel requirements in support of AMISOM
Facilities and infrastructure	75 062.7	72 599.9	2 397.5	65.3	97	Material and equipment along with contractual services to support infrastructure and camp construction for AMISOM in Mogadishu as well as fuel requirements to support the troops in theatre	Materials and equipment along with contractual services to support UNSOA support base and headquarters in Mombasa and Nairobi, respectively
Ground transportation	9 527.3	8 724.9	745.1	57.3	92	Material handling, airfield and engineering equipment and associated services in support of AMISOM	Light vehicles and associated services in support of UNSOA operation in Nairobi and Mombasa based on United Nations standard ratios

Category	Cost estimates					Comments	
	Total	*AMISOM*	*UNSOA*	*United Nations planning team*	*AMISOM percentage*	*AMISOM*	*UNSOA*
Air transportation	13 066.1	13 066.1	—		100	Multi-role aircraft in support of AMISOM positioned in Mombasa	
Naval transportation	431.4	431.4	—	—	100	Operating costs of 6 patrol boats in support of AMISOM in Mogadishu	
Communications	16 490.8	14 848.5	1 605.9	29.1	90	Communication and information management equipment and services in support of AMISOM in Mogadishu	Communication and information management equipment and services in support of UNSOA operations in Nairobi and Mombasa
Information technology	4 269.8	2 580.4	1 598.9	90.5	60	Information technology equipment and services in support of AMISOM in Mogadishu	Information technology equipment and services in support of UNSOA operation in Nairobi and Mombasa
Medical	6 982.2	6 982.2	—	—	100	Medical evacuation and hospitalization services in support of AMISOM personnel	
Special equipment	—	—	—	—	—		
Other supplies, services and equipment	23 744.8	22 702.2	951.2	3.8	96	Mine action activities and freight requirements to support AMISOM operation in Mogadishu	External audit, finance and training fees and common services with the United Nations Office at Nairobi
Quick-impact projects	—	—	—	—	—		
Subtotal	**150 804.2**	**141 935.6**	**8 283.4**	**490.3**	**94**		
Gross requirements	**205 221.3**	**173 691.8**	**27 531.5**	**3 903.1**	**85**		
Staff assessment income	2 894.2	—	2 523.4	370.8	—		
Net requirements	**202 327.1**	**173 691.8**	**25 008.1**	**3 532.3**	**86**		
Voluntary contributions in kind (budgeted)	—	—	—	—	—		
Total requirements	**205 221.3**	**173 691.8**	**27 531.5**	**3 903.1**	**85**		

Annex III

Summary of proposed changes in staffing, 1 July 2010 to 30 June 2011

Office/Section/Unit	*Number*	*Level*	*Description*
Office of the Director	+ 1	P-3	1 Planning Officer
	+ 5	NS	5 Radio Operators for the Mombasa Support Base/Safety and Security Section
Subtotal	**+ 6**		
Support operations services	+ 2	NS	2 Property Disposal Assistants/Property Disposal Unit
Subtotal	**+ 2**		
Technical services	+ 1	P-3	Information technology Data Security Officer/Communications and Information Technology Section
	+ 1	FS	Telecommunications Officer/Radio Technician/Communications and Information Technology Section
	- 1	P-4	Chief Medical Officer, reclassified from P-4 to P-5
	+ 1	P-5	Chief Medical Officer, reclassified from P-4 to P-5
	- 1	NS	Telecommunications Assistant/PABX/ Communications and Information Technology Section
	+ 1	FS	PABX Supervisor/Communications and Information Technology Section
	- 1	FS	Reassignment of Fuel Assistant to General Supply Unit
	+ 1	FS	Reassignment of Fuel Assistant to General Supply Unit
Subtotal	**+ 2**		
Total			
International	**+ 4**		
National	**+ 6**		
	+10		

Abbreviations: NS, national staff; FS, Field Service.

Annex IV

United Nations support for the African Union Mission in Somalia: pattern of expenditure for 2007/08 and 2008/09 and projected for 2009/10

Period	*Type*	*Amount*	*Actual expenditure*	*Unencumbered balance*	*Variance (percentage)*
		(United States dollars)			
(1 May 2007 to 30 June 2008)	Commitment authority	2 400 000	2 149 000	251 000	10.5
2008/09	Commitment authority	75 641 900	72 042 800	3 599 100	4.8
2009/10	Budget (A/64/465)	213 580 000	150 025 683 (projected)	63 554 317	29.8
Average, 2007-2010	—	—	—	—	**15.03**

Annex V

United Nations Support Office for the African Union Mission in Somalia

A. Proposed staffing (250) and organization chart, 2010/11


Office of the Director
(12 posts)
1 D-2, 2 P-5, 1 P-4, 1 P-3,[a] 2 P-3, 1 FS, 4 NS
Safety and Security Section
(15 posts)
1 P-4, 2 FS-6, 4 FS, 1 NPO, 2 NS, 5 NS[a]
Support Operations Services
(2 posts)
1 D-1, 1 FS
Administrative Services
(2 posts)
1 D-1, 1 FS
Technical Services
(2 posts)
1 D-1, 1 FS
Budget and Trust Fund
(7 posts)
1 P-5, 1 P-4, 2 FS, 1 NPO, 2 NS
Property management
(17 posts)
1 P-4, 3 P-3,
3 FS-6, 2 FS, 6 NS, 2 NS[a]
Internal review boards
(3 posts)
1 P-3, 1 FS, 1 NS
Information support management
(5 posts)
1 P-5, 1 P-4, 2 FS-6, 1 NS
Mombasa support base
(6 posts)
1 P-5, 2 P-4, 1 FS, 2 NS
Operations and plans
(7 posts)
1 P-5, 4 P-4, 1 P-3, 1 NS
Finance Section
(10 posts)
1 P-4, 1 P-3, 1 FS-6, 3 FS, 4 NS
Human Resources Section
(10 posts)
1 P-4, 1 FS-6, 3 FS, 1 NPO, 4 NS
Training Unit
(4 posts)
1 P-4, 1 FS, 1 NPO, 1 NS
Procurement Section
(10 posts)
1 P-5, 1 P-4, 2 P-3
1 FS-6, 3 FS, 2 NS
Contracts Management Section
(8 posts)
1 P-5, 2 P-4, 3 P-3, 1 FS, 1 NS
Aviation Section
(9 posts)
1 P-4, 1 P-3, 1 FS-6, 1 FS, 2 NPO, 3 NS
Communications and Information Technology Section
(37 posts)
1 P-5, 2 P-4, 1 P-3, 1 P-3,[a] 2 FS-7,
1 FS-6, 1 FS-6,[a] 1 FS-6,[b] 17 FS, 10 NS
Engineering Section
(24 posts)
1 P-5, 2 P-4, 1 P-3, 1 P-2,
1 FS-6, 10 FS, 1 NPO, 7 NS
Geographic Information System Section
(3 posts)
1 P-4, 2 NPO
Medical Services
(7 posts)
1 P-5[b], 1 P-3, 1 FS, 3 NPO, 1 NS
Movement control
(17 posts)
1 P-4, 1 FS-6, 2 FS,[b] 3 NPO, 10 NS
Supply Section
(15 posts)
1 P-5, 1 P-3, 2 FS-6, 4 FS, 1 NPO,
6 NS
Transport Section
(18 posts)
1 P-4, 1 FS-6, 3 FS, 13 NS

	D-2	*D-1*	*P-5*	*P-4*	*P-3*	*P-2/1*	*FS-7*	*FS-6*	*FS*	*NPO*	*NS*	*Total*
Office of the Director	1	—	2	2	3	—	—	2	5	1	11	**27**
Deputy Director	—	1	4	9	5	—	—	5	7	1	15	**47**
Administrative services	—	1	2	6	6	—	—	3	12	2	12	**44**
Technical services		1	4	8	6	1	2	9	39	12	50	**132**
Total	**1**	**3**	**12**	**25**	**20**	**1**	**2**	**19**	**63**	**16**	**88**	**250**

Abbreviations: FS, Field Service; NS, national staff; NPO, National Professional Officer.

[a] New.

[b] Reclassified.

B. Proposed staffing (134) and organization chart for the United Nations Support Office for the African Union Mission in Somalia in Nairobi, 2010/11


Office of the Director
(12 posts)
1 D-2, 2 P-5, 1 P-4, 1 P-3,[a] 2 P-3,
1 FS, 4 NS
Safety and Security Section
(3 posts)
1 P-4, 1 FS-6, 1 NS
Support Operations Services
(2 posts)
1 D-1, 1 FS
Administrative Services
(2 posts)
1 D-1, 1 FS
Technical Services
(2 posts)
1 D-1, 1 FS
Budget and Trust Fund
(7 posts)
1 P-5, 1 P-4, 2 FS, 1 NPO, 2 NS
Property management
(3 posts)
1 P-4, 1 P-3, 1 NS
Internal review boards
(3 posts)
1 P-3, 1 FS, 1 NS
Information support management
(5 posts)
1 P-5, 1 P-4, 2 FS-6, 1 NS
Operations and plans
(7 posts)
1 P-5, 4 P-4, 1 P-3, 1 NS
Finance Section
(10 posts)
1 P-4, 1 P-3, 1 FS-6, 3 FS, 4 NS
Human Resources Section
(8 posts)
1 P-4, 1 FS-6, 2 FS, 1 NPO, 3 NS
Training Unit
(2 posts)
1 P-4, 1 NPO
Procurement Section
(8 posts)
1 P-5, 1 P-4, 2 P-3, 1 FS-6, 2 FS, 1 NS
Contracts Management Section
(6 posts)
1 P-5, 2 P-4, 2 P-3, 1 NS
Aviation Section
(5 posts)
1 P-4, 1 P-3, 2 NPO, 1 NS
Communications and Information Technology Section
(18 posts)
1 P-5, 2 P-4, 1 P-3,[a] 1 FS-7, 8 FS, 5 NS
Engineering Section
(5 posts)
1 P-5, 1 P-4, 1 FS-6, 1 FS, 1 NS
Geographic Information System Section
(3 posts)
1 P-4, 2 NPO
Medical Services
(5 posts)
1 P-5,[b] 1 P-3, 1 FS, 1 NPO, 1 NS
Movement control
(4 posts)
1 P-4, 1 FS, 2 NS
Supply Section
(4 posts)
1 P-5, 1 FS-6, 2 NS
Transport Section
(10 posts)
1 P-4, 9 NS

	D-2	*D-1*	*P-5*	*P-4*	*P-3*	*P-2/1*	*FS-6*	*FS*	*NPO*	*NS*	*FS-7*	*Total*
Office of the Director	1	—	2	2	3	—	1	1	—	5	—	**15**
Deputy Director	—	1	3	7	3	—	2	4	1	6	—	**27**
Administrative services	—	1	2	6	5	—	3	8	2	9	—	**36**
Technical services	—	1	4	7	3	—	2	12	5	21	1	**56**
Total	**1**	**3**	**11**	**22**	**14**	**—**	**8**	**25**	**8**	**41**	**1**	**134**

C. Proposed staffing (116) and organization chart for the United Nations Support Office for the African Union Mission in Somalia in Mombasa, 2010/11



	D-2	*D-1*	*P-5*	*P-4*	*P-3*	*P-2/1*	*FS-7*	*FS-6*	*FS*	*NPO*	*NS*	*Total*
Chief, Mombasa Support Base	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	1	6	1	7	**16**
Administration Section	—	—	—	1	3	—	—	3	5	—	10	**22**
Logistics Section	—	—	—	1	1	—	—	4	10	6	18	**40**
Communications and Information Technology Section	—	—	—	—	1	—	1	3	9	—	5	**19**
Engineering Section	—	—	—	1	1	1	—	—	9	1	6	**19**
Total	—	—	**1**	**3**	**6**	**1**	**1**	**11**	**39**	**8**	**46**	**116**

Annex VI

United Nations Political Office for Somalia (Nairobi): proposed staffing (55) and organization chart, 2010/11


Office of the Chief of Staff
(9 posts)
Chief of Staff/ Head of Planning 1 P-5
Planning Unit (3 posts)
1 P-4, 1 P-3, 1 FS
Civil Affairs (1 post)
1 P-3
Gender Affairs (1 post)
1 P-4
Translation Unit (3 posts)
1 P-3, 2 NO
Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General
(4 posts)
1 USG, 1 P-4, 2 FS
Office of the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General
(2 posts)
1 D-2, 1 FS
Legal Affairs
(3 posts)
1 P-5, 1 P-4, 1 FS
Public Information
(3 posts)
1 P-4, 1 P-3, 1 FS
Security Adviser
(9 posts)
1 P-4, 5 FS, 3 FS
Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Unit
(2 posts)
1 P-4, 1 P-3
Political Affairs Office
(7 posts)
1 P-5, 2 P-4, 2 P-3, 1 FS, 1 LL
Security Sector Development Office
(7 posts)
Office of the Director
(3 posts)
1 D-1, 1 P-5, 1 FS
Humanitarian and Development Affairs Unit
(1 post)
1 P-5
Human Rights Unit
(4 posts)
1 P-5, 1 P-2, 1 FS, 1 LL
Administrative Liaison Office
(4 posts)
1 P-4, 1 P-3, 1 P-3 (b), 1 LL
Police Advisory Unit
(2 posts)
1 P-5, 1 P-4
Military Advisory Unit
(2 posts)
1 P-5, 1 LL (a)
Total Nairobi — 55 posts
Professional: 32
FS — Field Service: 17
NO — National Officer: 2
LL — Local level: 4

Annex VII

Accountability for United Nations property



United Nations A/64/755–S/2010/209

General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.: General
28 April 2010
English
Original: Arabic

General Assembly
Sixty-fourth session
Agenda item 15
The situation in the Middle East

Security Council
Sixty-fifth year

Identical letters dated 20 April 2010 from the Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

On instructions from my Government, I transmit to you herewith a letter of complaint regarding a violation of the Blue Line committed by Israeli enemy forces on the night of Saturday, 17 April 2010 (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the sixty-fourth session of the General Assembly, under agenda item 15, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Nawaf **Salam**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

10-33409 (E) 280410 290410

Please recycle

Annex to the identical letters dated 20 April 2010 from the Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

Lebanese Republic
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Emigres

Beirut, 19 April 2010

On the night of Saturday, 17 April 2010, at 9.30 p.m., an Israeli enemy motorized brigade assembled in occupied Palestinian territory near the Lebanese town of Udaysah and fired a flare shell over a civilian residence where a dinner party in honour of a local parliamentarian was being given. The shell exploded in the sky, causing fear and terror among the town's Lebanese citizens.

This Israeli aggression is a fundamental and blatant violation of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006) that raises tensions on both sides of the border. It is also another in a series of daily aggressions, violations and provocations that the Israeli enemy has persisted in committing since the adoption of resolution 1701 (2006), and a threat to international peace and security.

United Nations A/64/756–S/2010/222

General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.: General
29 April 2010
English
Original: Arabic

General Assembly
Sixty-fourth session
Agenda item 15
The situation in the Middle East

Security Council
Sixty-fifth year

Identical letters dated 22 April 2010 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

On instructions from my Government, I transmit to you herewith a letter of complaint regarding a violation of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006) committed by Israeli enemy forces on the morning of Wednesday, 21 April 2010 (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the sixty-fourth session of the General Assembly, under agenda item 15, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Caroline **Ziade**
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

10-33662 (E) 010510 030510

Please recycle

Annex to the identical letters dated 22 April 2010 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

On the morning of Wednesday, 21 April 2010, Israeli enemy troops unveiled a memorial that Israel had built on occupied Lebanese territory near Birkat Naqqar, south-west of the Lebanese town of Shab'a. This action is a flagrant violation of international law and international humanitarian law, in particular the Fourth Geneva Convention and the 1907 Hague Convention, both of which forbid an occupying Power from destroying or altering public and private property. The erection by the Israeli enemy of a memorial on occupied Lebanese territory and subsequent alienation of territory that only the Lebanese State and people have the right to dispose of and over which only they exercise sovereignty, in addition to the exploitation by Israeli enemy forces of the land, which is a natural resource, reaffirm the hostile nature of the Israeli occupation and Israel's disdain for international law and norms, and once again clearly demonstrate Israel's insistence on flouting international resolutions and its refusal to accept the compulsoriness of those resolutions. This violation is a provocation to the Lebanese people. It will raise tensions and threaten international peace and security. It is also a blatant violation of the sanctity and integrity of Lebanon's territory and its sovereignty over the occupied Shab'a Farms and of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006), under which Israel is obliged to withdraw from all Lebanese territory.

Lebanon calls on the Secretary-General, the international community and, in particular, the Security Council to shoulder their responsibilities and take appropriate decisions, preventive measures and practical action to compel Israel to remove this memorial, withdraw immediately from occupied Lebanese territory and implement all provisions of resolution 1701 (2006).

United Nations A/64/757

General Assembly

Distr.: General
26 April 2010

Original: English

Sixty-fourth session
Agenda item 96
General and complete disarmament

Letter dated 22 April 2010 from the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to transmit herewith a copy of the "Conclusion of the Chairman of the Tehran Conference on Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, 17 and 18 April 2010" (see annex).

It would be appreciated if the present letter and its annex could be circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 96.

(*Signed*) Mohammad **Khazaee**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

10-32977 (E) 290410

Please recycle

Annex to the letter dated 22 April 2010 from the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Conclusion of the Chairman of the Tehran Conference on Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, 17 and 18 April 2010

The International Conference on Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, with its theme "Nuclear energy for all, nuclear weapons for none" was held in Tehran on 17 and 18 April 2010. At the Conference, many high-level officials and eminent experts of about 60 countries participated and discussed the concerns and challenges related to disarmament and the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, in particular, nuclear weapons.

Taking note of the statements and presentations made by the participants, the Conference:

1. Expressed deep concern about the complicated situation over international disarmament and security, the continued existence of weapons of mass destruction, in particular nuclear weapons and the use or threat of use of such weapons.

2. Put an emphasis on nuclear disarmament as the highest priority of the international community and on the necessity for the total elimination of such inhumane weapons in accordance with the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the final documents of the 1995 and 2000 Review Conferences, in particular the complete realization of the 13 nuclear disarmament practical steps committed to by nuclear-weapons States.

3. Stressed the importance of redoubling efforts to overcome the current deadlock to achieve nuclear disarmament in all its aspects and the promotion of multilateralism in the field of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.

4. Emphasized the necessity to conclude a comprehensive, non-discriminatory and legally binding convention on the total ban on the development, production, transfer, stockpiling, use or threat of use of such weapons, in order to achieve a world free from nuclear weapons, taking note of the experience of the concluding of two conventions, namely the Chemical Weapons Convention of 1992 and the Biological Weapons Convention of 1972, as well as providing comprehensive and non-discriminatory security assurances, pending the total elimination of nuclear weapons.

5. Stressed the need to take measures for the realization of nuclear-weapon-free zones in different parts of the world, in particular in the Middle East, based on the relevant United Nations resolutions and pending the achievement of such a goal as a first step, the accession of the Zionist regime to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and putting its nuclear facilities under the International Atomic Energy Agency Comprehensive Safeguards is a must.

6. Stressed the principles of the irreversibility, transparency and verifiability in any bilateral or multilateral agreement on cutting the number of nuclear weapons.

7. Affirmed the inalienable right of the Non-Proliferation Treaty States parties to use nuclear energy in all its aspects, and the necessity to promote international cooperation as a pillar of the Non-Proliferation Treaty in accordance with the commitments under article IV.

8. Emphasized that attacking the peaceful nuclear facilities results in grave negative consequences for human beings and the environment and is a gross violation of international law and of the Charter of the United Nations.

9. Expressed its grave concern about the weakening of the non-proliferation regime due to the implementation of double standards and discriminatory approaches by certain nuclear-weapon States, in particular the cooperation of certain nuclear-weapon States with the Non-Proliferation Treaty non-parties, and neglecting the nuclear arsenal of the Zionist regime.

10. Emphasized the necessity to comply with the respective obligations on destruction of chemical weapons within the agreed time frame (2012), as well as the necessity to address the biological threats.

11. Taking note of the importance of this Conference and its results, we would like, as a host, to propose that the results of this Conference be submitted to the Secretary-General and other relevant international organizations and be recorded as a document of these organizations.

12. Noting also the interest showed by the participants to the topic of this Conference, and in order to review ways and means to promote the goals of this Conference, and since a number of participants expressed their interest, the second conference on "International disarmament and security" will be held in Tehran in April 2011.

United Nations A/64/758

General Assembly

Distr.: General
27 April 2010

Original: English

Sixty-fourth session
Agenda item 96
General and complete disarmament

Letter dated 31 March 2010 from the Permanent Representatives of Australia and Japan to the United Nations addressed to the President of the General Assembly

It is our pleasure to transmit herewith the synopsis of the report of the International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament, co-chaired by the former Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Gareth Evans, and the former Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs, Yoriko Kawaguchi (see annex).

The Commission was launched as a joint initiative of the Governments of Australia and Japan in September 2008. The Commission is an independent enterprise, composed of 15 Commissioners worldwide, including the co-Chairs, Mr. Evans and Ms. Kawaguchi.

On 15 December 2009, the co-Chairs presented the report to Prime Ministers Kevin Rudd and Yukio Hatoyama in Tokyo as the outcome of the activities of the Commission.

Both our Governments hope that the report will serve as an important contribution to international efforts for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. We hope the report will be especially useful as we prepare for the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

We would be grateful if the present letter and its annex could be circulated as a document of the sixty-fourth session of the General Assembly, under agenda item 96.

(*Signed*) Gary **Quinlan**
Permanent Representative
Australia

(*Signed*) Yukio **Takasu**
Permanent Representative
Japan

10-33145 (E) 300410

Please recycle

Annex

[Original: Arabic, English, French, Russian and Spanish]

Eliminating nuclear threats

A Practical Agenda for Global Policymakers

Synopsis: a comprehensive action agenda

This Synopsis is a highly abbreviated and selective distillation of the very much more detailed analysis and argument in the Commission's report. The references given are to sections and paragraphs in that full report, which is available online at www.icnnd.org.

A. WHY THIS REPORT, AND WHY NOW

- Nuclear weapons are the most inhumane weapons ever conceived, inherently indiscriminate in those they kill and maim, and with an impact deadly for decades. They are the only weapons ever invented that have the capacity to wholly destroy life on this planet, and the arsenals we now possess are able to do so many times over. The problem of nuclear weapons is at least equal to that of climate change in terms of gravity – and much more immediate in its potential impact.

- So long as any state has nuclear weapons, others will want them. So long as any such weapons remain, it defies credibility that they will not one day be used, by accident, miscalculation or design. And any such use would be catastrophic. It is sheer luck that the world has escaped such catastrophe until now.

- Maintaining the status quo is not an option. The threats and risks associated with the failure to persuade existing nuclear-armed states to disarm, to prevent new states acquiring nuclear weapons, to stop any terrorist actor gaining access to such weapons, and to properly manage a rapid expansion in civil nuclear energy, defy complacency. They must be tackled with much more conviction and effectiveness than the world has managed so far.

- There have been many major international commission, panel, research institute and think tank reports addressing these issues. What makes this report distinctive is, hopefully, its timeliness; comprehensiveness; global consultative reach; attention to pragmatic realities as well as ambitious ideals; intended accessibility to non-specialist policymakers; and strong action orientation, reflected in the short, medium and longer term action agendas that bind together its specific policy proposals.

- With new U.S. and Russian leadership seriously committed to disarmament action, there is a new opportunity – the first since the immediate post-World War II and post-Cold War years – to halt, and reverse, the nuclear weapons tide once and for all. This report describes, not just rhetorically but in the detail that global policymakers need, how that opportunity can and should be seized. *[Section 1]*

B. NUCLEAR THREATS AND RISKS

- ***Existing Nuclear-Armed States.*** Twenty years after the end of the Cold War there are at least 23,000 nuclear warheads still in existence, with a combined blast capacity equivalent to 150,000 Hiroshima bombs. The U.S. and Russia together have over 22,000, and France, the UK, China, India, Pakistan and Israel around 1,000 between them. Nearly half of all warheads are still operationally deployed, and the U.S. and Russia each have over 2,000 weapons on dangerously high alert, ready to be launched immediately – within a decision window of just 4-8 minutes for each president – in the event of perceived attack. The command and control systems of the Cold War years were repeatedly strained by mistakes and false alarms. With more nuclear-armed states now, and more system vulnerabilities, the near miracle of no nuclear exchange cannot continue in perpetuity. *[Section 2]*

- ***New Nuclear-Armed States.*** The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) system has been under severe strain in recent years, with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) struggling with verification, compliance and enforcement failures, and backward steps occurring in the world's most volatile regions. India and Pakistan joined the undeclared Israel as fully-fledged nuclear-armed states in 1998; North Korea is now likely to have some half-dozen nuclear explosive devices; and Iran probably now has weapon-making capability, with real potential for generating a regional proliferation surge should it choose to cross the weaponization red-line. *[Section 3]*

- ***Nuclear Terrorism.*** Terrorist groups exist with the intent, and capacity, to create massive nuclear destruction. With manageable technology long in the public domain, and black market sourcing, a Hiroshima-sized nuclear device could possibly be detonated from a truck or small boat inside any major city. A "dirty bomb", combining conventional explosives with radioactive materials like medical isotopes, would be a much easier option: while not generating anything like the casualties of a fission or fusion bomb, it would have a psychological impact at least equal to 9/11. *[Section 4]*

- ***Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy.*** The likely rapid expansion of civil nuclear energy in the decades ahead, not least in response to climate-change concerns, will present some additional proliferation and security risks. Particularly if accompanied by the construction of new national facilities for enrichment at the front end of the fuel cycle and reprocessing at the back end, it could mean a great deal more fissile material becoming potentially available for destructive purposes. *[Section 5]*

C. MEETING THE CHALLENGE OF NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT

BASIC THEMES

- **Delegitimizing nuclear weapons.** The critical need is to finally transform perceptions of the role and utility of nuclear weapons, from occupying a central place in strategic thinking to being seen as quite marginal, and ultimately wholly unnecessary. There are good answers to all the familiar deterrence and other justifications for retaining nuclear weapons.

- It is neither defensible nor sustainable for some states to argue that nuclear weapons are an indispensable, legitimate and open-ended guarantor of their own and allies' security, but that others have no right to acquire them to protect their own perceived security needs.

- "Extended deterrence" does not have to mean extended *nuclear* deterrence. *[Section 6]*

- ***A phased approach.*** Achieving a nuclear weapon free world will be a long, complex and formidably difficult process, most realistically pursued as a two-phase process, with minimization the immediate goal and elimination the ultimate one. *[Section 7]*

- Short term (to 2012) and medium term (to 2025) efforts should focus on achieving as soon as possible, and no later than 2025, a "minimization point" characterised by very low numbers of warheads (less than 10 per cent of present arsenals), agreed "no first use" doctrine, and force deployments and alert status reflecting that doctrine. *[Sections 17, 18]*

- Analysis and debate should commence now on the conditions necessary to move from the minimization point to elimination, even if a target date for getting to zero cannot at this stage be credibly specified. *[Section 19]*

KEY POLICIES

- ***Action Consensus***. The 2010 NPT Review Conference should agree on a 20-point statement, "A New International Consensus for Action on Nuclear Disarmament", updating and extending the "Thirteen Practical Steps" agreed in 2000. *[16.6-11; Box 16-1]*

- ***Numbers***. No later than 2025 U.S. and Russian arsenals should be reduced to a total of 500 nuclear warheads each, with at least no increases, and desirably significant reductions, in the arsenals – now totalling some 1,000 warheads – of the other nuclear-armed states. A global maximum of 2,000 warheads would represent a more than 90 per cent reduction in present arsenals. *[18.1-3]*

- All nuclear-armed states should now explicitly commit *not to increase* the number of their nuclear weapons. *[17.15-16]*

- ***Doctrine.*** Pending the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons, every nuclear-armed state should make as soon as possible, and no later than 2025, an unequivocal "no first use" (NFU) declaration. *[17.28]*

- If not prepared to go so far now, each such state – and in particular the U.S. in its Nuclear Posture Review – should at the very least accept the principle that the "sole purpose" of possessing nuclear weapons is to deter others from using such weapons against that state or its allies.

- Allied states affected by such declarations should be given firm assurances that they will not be exposed to other unacceptable risks, including from biological and chemical weapons. *[17.28-32]*

- New and unequivocal negative security assurances (NSAs) should be given by all nuclear-armed states, supported by binding Security Council resolution, that they will not use nuclear weapons against NPT-compliant non-nuclear weapon states. *[17.33-39]*

- ***Force Deployment and Alert Status.*** Changes should be made as soon as possible to ensure that, while remaining demonstrably survivable to a disarming first strike, nuclear forces are not instantly useable. Stability should be maximized by deployments and launch alert status being transparent. *[7.12-15; 17.40-50]*

- The decision-making fuse for the launch of any nuclear weapons must be lengthened, and weapons taken off launch-on-warning alert as soon as possible. *[17.43]*

- ***Parallel Security Issues.*** *Missile defence* should be revisited, with a view to allowing the further development of theatre ballistic missile defence systems, including potential joint operations in areas of mutual concern, but setting severe limits on strategic ballistic missile defences. *[2.30-34; 18.28-30]*

- *Conventional arms imbalances*, both quantitative and qualitative, between the nuclear-armed states, and in particular the relative scale of U.S. capability, need to be seriously addressed if this issue is not to become a significant impediment to future bilateral and multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations. *[18.34-36]*

- Continuing strong efforts should be made to develop more effective ways of defending against potential *biological* attacks including building a workable verification regime, and to promote universal adherence to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention and the Chemical Weapons Convention. *[17.29; 18.32-33]*

- Ongoing attempts to prevent an arms race in *outer space* (PAROS) should be strongly supported. *[18.31]*

- ***Testing.*** All states that have not already done so should sign and ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) unconditionally and without delay. U.S. ratification is a critically needed circuit-breaker: it would have an immediate impact on other hold-out states, and add major new momentum to both disarmament and non-proliferation efforts.

- Pending the CTBT's entry into force, all states should continue to refrain from nuclear testing. *[Section 11]*

- ***Availability of Fissile Material.*** All nuclear-armed states should declare or maintain a moratorium on the production of fissile material for weapon purposes pending the negotiation and entry into force as soon as possible of a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT).

- On the question of pre-existing stocks, a phased approach should be adopted, with the first priority a cap on production; then an effort to ensure that all fissile material other than in weapons becomes subject to irreversible, verified non-explosive use commitments; and with fissile material released through dismantlement being brought under these commitments as weapon reductions are agreed.

- As an interim step, all nuclear-armed states should voluntarily declare their fissile material stocks and the amount they regard as excess to their weapons needs, place such excess material under IAEA safeguards as soon as practicable, and convert it as soon as possible to forms that cannot be used for nuclear weapons. *[Section 12]*

D. MEETING THE CHALLENGE OF NON-PROLIFERATION

BASIC THEMES

- Nuclear non-proliferation efforts should focus both on the demand side – persuading states that nuclear weapons will not advance their national security or other interests – and the supply

side, through maintaining and strengthening a comprehensive array of measures designed to make it as difficult as possible for states to buy or build such weapons. *[Section 8]*

KEY POLICIES

- ***NPT Safeguards and Verification.*** All states should accept the application of the IAEA Additional Protocol. To encourage universal take-up, acceptance of it should be a condition of all nuclear exports. *[9.7]*

- The Additional Protocol and its annexes should be updated and strengthened to make clear the IAEA's right to investigate possible weaponization activity, and by adding specific reference to dual-use items, reporting on export denials, shorter notice periods and the right to interview specific individuals. *[9.8-9]*

- ***NPT Compliance and Enforcement.*** In determining compliance, the IAEA should confine itself essentially to technical criteria, applying them with consistency and credibility, and leaving the political consequences for the Security Council to determine. *[9.15]*

- The UN Security Council should severely discourage withdrawal from the NPT by making it clear that this will be regarded as prima facie a threat to international peace and security, with all the punitive consequences that may follow from that under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. *[9.20]*

- A state withdrawing from the NPT should not be free to use for non-peaceful purposes nuclear materials, equipment and technology acquired while party to the NPT. Any such material provided before withdrawal should so far as possible be returned, with this being enforced by the Security Council. *[9.21-22]*

- ***Strengthening the IAEA.*** The IAEA should make full use of the authority already available to it, including special inspections, and states should be prepared to strengthen its authority as deficiencies are identified. *[9.24]*

- The IAEA should be given a one-off injection of funds to refurbish the Safeguards Analytical Laboratory; a significant increase in its regular budget support, without a "zero real growth" constraint; and sufficient security of future funding to enable effective medium to long term planning. *[9.25-27]*

- ***Non-NPT Treaties and Mechanisms.*** The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) should develop a criteria-based approach to cooperation agreements with states outside the NPT, taking into account factors such as ratification of the CTBT, willingness to end unsafeguarded fissile material production, and states' record in securing nuclear facilities and materials and controlling nuclear-related exports. *[10.3-9]*

- The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) should be reconstituted within the UN system as a neutral organization to assess intelligence, coordinate and fund activities, and make both generic and specific recommendations or decisions concerning the interdiction of suspected materials being carried to or from countries of proliferation concern. *[10.10-12]*

- ***Extending Obligations to Non-NPT States.*** Recognising the reality that the three nuclear-armed states now outside the NPT – India, Pakistan and Israel – are not likely to become members any time soon, every effort should be made to achieve their participation in parallel

instruments and arrangements which apply equivalent non-proliferation and disarmament obligations. *[10.13-16]*

- Provided they satisfy strong objective criteria demonstrating commitment to disarmament and non-proliferation, and sign up to specific future commitments in this respect, these states should have access to nuclear materials and technology for civilian purposes on the same basis as an NPT member. *[10.17]*

- These states should participate in multilateral disarmament negotiations on the same basis as the nuclear-weapon state members of the NPT, and not be expected to accept different treatment because of their non-membership of that treaty. *[10.18]*

- ***Priorities for the 2010 NPT Review Conference.*** The primary focus should be on reaching agreement on:
  - a new 20-point statement, "A New International Consensus for Action on Nuclear Disarmament", updating and extending the "Thirteen Practical Steps" agreed in 2000;
  - measures to strengthen NPT safeguards and verification, compliance and enforcement, and the IAEA (as above);
  - forward movement on the Middle East Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone, with the UN Secretary-General convening an early conference of all relevant states to address creative and fresh ways to implement the 1995 resolution;
  - strengthened implementation of nuclear security measures (see Meeting Terrorism Challenge below); and
  - further support for peaceful uses of nuclear energy. *[Section 16]*

E. MEETING THE CHALLENGE OF NUCLEAR TERRORISM

BASIC THEMES

- Effectively countering terrorism of any kind involves a complex mix of nationally and internationally coordinated protection and policing strategies (most immediately important in dealing with the threat of nuclear terrorism), and also political, peacebuilding and psychological strategies (necessary to address the underlying causes of terrorist behaviour).

- At the 2010 Nuclear Security Summit, and in related policy deliberations, the main need is to focus on the effective implementation of existing agreed measures rather than the development of new ones. *[Section 13; Box 13-1]*

KEY POLICIES

- All states should agree to take effective measures to strengthen the security of nuclear materials and facilities, including by adopting and implementing the 2005 amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, accelerating delivery of the Cooperative Threat Reduction and associated programs worldwide, and making a greater commitment to international capacity building and information sharing. *[13.5-16]*

- On the control of material useable for "dirty bombs", further efforts need to be made to cooperatively implement the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources, with assistance to states in updating legislation and licensing practice and promoting awareness among users. *[13.17-21]*

- Strong support should be given to the emerging science of nuclear forensics, designed to identify the sources of materials found in illicit trafficking or used in nuclear explosions. *[13.22-25]*

F. MEETING THE CHALLENGE OF CIVIL NUCLEAR ENERGY

BASIC THEMES

- The use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes should continue to be strongly supported as one of the three fundamental pillars of the NPT, along with disarmament and non-proliferation. Increased resources should be provided, including through the IAEA's Technical Cooperation Programme, to assist developing states in taking full advantage of peaceful nuclear energy for human development.

- Proliferation resistance should be endorsed by governments and industry as an essential objective in the design and operation of nuclear facilities, and promoted through both institutional and technical measures – neither is sufficient without the other. *[Section 14]*

KEY POLICIES

- ***Nuclear Energy Management***. Support should be given to the initiative launched at the 2008 Hokkaido Toyako G8 Summit for international cooperation on nuclear energy infrastructure, designed to raise awareness worldwide of the importance of the three Ss – safeguards, security and safety – and assist countries concerned in developing the relevant measures. *[14.4-6]*

- New technologies for spent fuel treatment should be developed to avoid current forms of reprocessing altogether. *[12.26]*

- The increasing use of plutonium recycle, and the prospective introduction of fast neutron reactors, must be pursued in ways which enhance non-proliferation objectives and avoid adding to proliferation and terrorism risks. *[14.9-15]*

- International measures such as spent fuel take-back arrangements by fuel suppliers, are desirable to avoid increasing spent fuel accumulations in a large number of states. *[14.13]*

- ***Multilateralizing the Nuclear Fuel Cycle*** – in particular through fuel banks and multilateral management of enrichment, reprocessing and spent fuel storage facilities – should be strongly supported. Such arrangements would play an invaluable role in building global confidence in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and provide an important foundation for a world free of nuclear weapons, for which a necessary requirement will be multilateral verification and control of all sensitive fuel cycle activities. *[Section 15]*

G. MOBILIZING AND SUSTAINING POLITICAL WILL

BASIC THEMES

- The will to do something difficult, sensitive or expensive will rarely be a given in international or domestic politics. It usually has to be painfully and laboriously constructed, case by case, context by context, with four main elements needing to come together:
  - *leadership*: without which inertia will always prevail – top down (from the major nuclear-armed states, particularly the U.S. and Russia), from peer groups (like-minded states worldwide) and bottom up (from civil society);
  - *knowledge*: both specialist and general, of the nature, magnitude and urgency of the nuclear problem: requiring better education and training in schools and universities, and stronger advocacy directed to policymakers, and those in the media and elsewhere who most influence them;
  - *strategy*: having a confident sense that there is a productive way forward: not just general objectives, but realistic action plans with detailed paths mapped and target benchmarks set; and
  - *process*: having the institutional and organisational means at hand – "campaign treaties", or other research and advocacy structures – to advance the relevant strategy in practice. *[Section 20]*

KEY POLICIES

- ***Nuclear Weapons Convention.*** Work should commence now, supported by interested governments, on further refining and developing the concepts in the model convention now in circulation, making its provisions as workable and realistic as possible, with the objective of having a fully-worked through draft available to inform and guide multilateral disarmament negotiations as they gain momentum. *[20.38-44]*

- ***Report Card.*** To help sustain political will over time, a regular "report card" should be published in which a distinguished international panel, with appropriately professional and broad based research support, would evaluate the performance of both nuclear-armed and non-nuclear-armed states against the action agendas identified in this report. *[20.49-50]*

- ***Monitoring and Advocacy Centre.*** Consideration should be given to the establishment of a "Global Centre on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament" to act as a focal point and clearing house for the work being done on nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament issues by many different institutions and organizations in many different countries, to provide research and advocacy support both for like-minded governments and for civil society organisations, and to prepare the "report card" described above. *[20.51-54]*

THE SHORT TERM ACTION AGENDA TO 2012: ACHIEVING INITIAL BENCHMARKS

On Disarmament

- Early agreement on a Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) follow-on treaty, with the U.S. and Russia agreeing to deep reductions in deployed strategic weapons, addressing the issue

of strategic missile defence and commencing negotiations on further deep cuts in all classes of weapons.

- Early movement on nuclear doctrine, with all nuclear-armed states declaring at least that the sole purpose of retaining the nuclear weapons they have is to deter others from using such weapons against them or their allies (while giving firm assurances to such allies that they will not be exposed to unacceptable risk from other sources, including in particular chemical and biological weapons).

- All nuclear-armed states to give strong negative security assurances to complying non-nuclear weapon states parties to the NPT, supported by binding Security Council resolution, that they will not use nuclear weapons against them.

- Early action on nuclear force postures, with particular attention to the negotiated removal to the extent possible of weapons from "launch-on-warning" status.

- Early commitment by all nuclear-armed states to not increasing their nuclear arsenals.

- Prepare the ground for a multilateral disarmament process by all nuclear-armed states conducting relevant studies; engaging in strategic dialogues with the U.S., Russia and each other; and commencing a joint dialogue within the framework of the Conference on Disarmament work program.

On Non-Proliferation

- A positive outcome for the May 2010 NPT Review Conference, with member states reaching agreement on measures to strengthen the NPT regime, including improved safeguards, verification, compliance and enforcement; measures to strengthen the effectiveness of the IAEA; "A New International Consensus for Action on Nuclear Disarmament" statement on disarmament issues; and measures to advance the implementation of the Middle East and other existing and proposed Nuclear Weapon Free Zones.

- Satisfactory negotiated resolution of the North Korea and Iran nuclear program problems.

- Movement toward strengthening non-proliferation regimes outside the NPT, and applying equivalent disciplines to NPT non-members.

On Both Disarmament and Non-Proliferation

- Bring into force the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.

- Conclude negotiations on an Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty.

On Nuclear Security

- Bring into force the 2005 Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, accelerate implementation of the cooperative threat reduction and associated programs designed to secure dangerous nuclear weapons, materials and technology worldwide, and achieve greater commitment to international capacity building and information sharing.

On Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy

- Movement toward greater multilateralization of the nuclear fuel cycle, and government-industry cooperation on proliferation-resistant technologies and other measures designed to reduce any risks associated with the expansion of civil nuclear energy.
- Promotion of international cooperation on nuclear energy infrastructure to raise awareness worldwide of the importance of the three Ss – safeguards, security and safety – and assist countries concerned in developing relevant measures.

[Section 17]

THE MEDIUM TERM ACTION AGENDA TO 2025: GETTING TO THE MINIMIZATION POINT

- Progressive achievement of interim disarmament objectives, culminating by 2025 in a "minimization point" characterized by:
  - low numbers: a world with no more than 2,000 nuclear warheads (less than 10 per cent of today's arsenals);
  - agreed doctrine: every nuclear-armed state committed to no first use;
  - credible force postures: verifiable deployments and alert status reflecting that doctrine.
- Progressive resolution of parallel security issues likely to impact on nuclear disarmament negotiations:
  - missile delivery systems and strategic missile defence;
  - space based weapons systems;
  - biological weapons;
  - conventional arms imbalances.
- Development and building of support for a comprehensive Nuclear Weapons Convention to legally underpin the ultimate transition to a nuclear weapon free world.
- Complete implementation (to extent already not achieved by 2012) of short-term objectives crucial for both disarmament and non-proliferation:
  - Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty in force;
  - Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty negotiated and in force, and a further agreement negotiated to put all fissile material not in weapons under international safeguards;
  - Measures to strengthen the NPT regime and the IAEA agreed and in force;
  - Nuclear security measures in force, and cooperative threat reduction and associated programs fully implemented;
  - Progressive implementation of measures to reduce the proliferation risks associated with the expansion of civil nuclear energy.

[Section 18]

THE LONGER TERM ACTION AGENDA BEYOND 2025: GETTING TO ZERO

- Create political conditions, regionally and globally, sufficiently cooperative and stable for the prospect of major war or aggression to be so remote that nuclear weapons are seen as having no remaining deterrent utility.
- Create the military conditions in which conventional arms imbalances, missile defence systems or any other national or intergovernmental-organisation capability is not seen as so inherently destabilizing as to justify the retention of a nuclear deterrent capability.
- Create verification conditions that will ensure confidence that any violation of the prohibition of nuclear weapons would be readily detected.
- Create the international legal regime and enforcement conditions that will ensure that any state breaching its prohibition obligations not to retain, acquire or develop nuclear weapons will be effectively penalized.
- Create fuel cycle management conditions that will ensure complete confidence that no state has the capacity to misuse uranium enrichment or plutonium reprocessing for weapons development purposes.
- Create personnel oversight conditions to ensure confidence that individuals' know-how in the design and building of nuclear weapons will not be misapplied in violation of prohibition obligations.

[Section 19]

Enclosure

THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION AND DISARMAMENT

Origins and Mandate. The International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament was initially proposed by Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd following his visit in June 2008 to the Hiroshima peace memorial, and agreed in July 2008 by Prime Minister Rudd and then Japanese Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda. The Commission was launched in New York in September 2008 by Prime Minister Rudd and then Prime Minister Taro Aso as a joint initiative of the Australian and Japanese Governments. The activities of the Commission have been embraced and supported by the present Japanese Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama.

The Commission's stated aim was to reinvigorate, at a high political level, global debate on nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, in the context both of the forthcoming 2010 NPT Review Conference, and beyond. It was designed to build upon, and take further in a sharply practical and action-oriented way, the work of distinguished earlier commissions and panels, notably the 1996 Canberra Commission, the 1999 Tokyo Forum, the 2004 UN High-level Panel, the 2006 Blix Commission, and the 2008 Zedillo Commission on the future of the IAEA.

Although initiated by two governments, and primarily funded by the government of Australia, the Commission is a completely independent body, with its members appointed in their personal capacity rather than as representatives of their respective countries.

Commissioners and Advisory Board. The Australian and Japanese prime ministers jointly invited to head the Commission as its Co-chairs former Foreign Ministers Gareth Evans and Yoriko Kawaguchi. They were joined as Commissioners by thirteen eminent and outstanding individuals from around the world, including former heads of state and ministers, military strategists and disarmament experts, all uniquely placed to bring fresh and imaginative vision to the undertaking: Turki Al Faisal (Saudi Arabia), Alexei Arbatov (Russian Federation), Gro Harlem Brundtland (Norway), Frene Noshir Ginwala (South Africa), François Heisbourg (France), Jehangir Karamat (Pakistan), Brajesh Mishra (India), Klaus Naumann (Germany), William Perry (United States), Wang Yingfan (China), Shirley Williams (United Kingdom), Wiryono Sastrohandoyo (Indonesia, replacing the late Ali Alatas) and Ernesto Zedillo (Mexico).

The Commission has been greatly assisted in its work by an Advisory Board of 27 distinguished experts from around the globe whose members were consulted individually and, in many cases, participated in one or more Commission meetings: Nobuyasu Abe (Japan), Shlomo Ben-Ami (Israel), Hans Blix (Sweden), Lakhdar Brahimi (Algeria), John Carlson (Australia), Nabil Fahmy (Egypt), Louise Fréchette (Canada), Lawrence Freedman (United Kingdom), Roberto García Moritán (Argentina), Han Sung-Joo (Republic of Korea), Prasad Kariyawasam (Sri Lanka), Henry Kissinger (United States), Shunsuke Kondo (Japan), Anne Lauvergeon (France), Martine Letts (Australia), Patricia Lewis (Ireland), Andrea Margelletti (Italy), Sam Nunn (United States), Robert O'Neill (Australia), George Perkovich (United States), V.R. Raghavan (India), George Robertson (United Kingdom), Michel Rocard (France), Adam Daniel Rotfeld (Poland), Yukio Satoh (Japan), George Shultz (United States), and Hans van den Broek (Netherlands).

Research Support and Administration. The Commission appointed nine Associated Research Centres to lead the effort in their respective countries or regions: the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (Washington DC and Moscow), Centre for International Governance and Innovation (Waterloo, Canada), Delhi Policy Group (New Delhi), Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales (San Jose, Costa Rica), Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique (Paris), Japan Institute of International Affairs (Tokyo), King's

College (London), Lowy Institute for International Policy (Sydney) and Tsinghua University (Beijing). From these Research Centres and other consultants worldwide over 50 pieces of new research were commissioned, most available on www.icnnd.org. Research Coordinator for the Commission was former Australian ambassador Ken Berry.

The work of the Commission was supported by a small Secretariat operating from the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade in Canberra, headed by Commission Secretary Ian Biggs and a parallel unit in the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Tokyo, headed by Toshio Sano.

Consultations. Four major Regional Meetings were held, attended by a total of 89 regional participants – from government, universities and research institutes, and where appropriate the nuclear energy sector – from 25 countries: in Latin America (Santiago, 2-3 May 2009), North East Asia (Beijing, 22-23 May 2009), the Middle East (Cairo, 29-30 September 2009) and South Asia (New Delhi, 3-4 October 2009). A day-long round-table with representatives of the world's nuclear power industry from six continents was held in association with the Commission's meeting in Moscow on 22 June 2009. Regular dialogue with civil society was sustained through the Commission's two NGO Advisers, Akira Kawasaki of Peace Boat and Tilman Ruff of the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons, and meetings in Washington DC and Hiroshima, including with atomic bomb victims (*hibakusha*). The Co-chairs and other Commissioners also had many individual consultations and briefings in key capitals, and with, inter alia, the UN in New York and Geneva, and the IAEA and Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization in Vienna.

Commission Meetings and Report. The Commission's first meeting in Sydney (19-21 October 2008) considered its mandate, work plan, and general approach, focusing on the value that it could add to previous and current work by others. Its second and third meetings in Washington DC (13-15 February 2009), and Moscow (19-21 June 2009) agreed on a detailed structure for its report and systematically discussed all relevant policy issues. Drafts of different sections of the report were then commissioned from a range of experts, including from among the Commissioners, Advisory Board and Secretariat members. A draft prepared by the Co-chairs themselves on the basis of those inputs was reviewed in detail, and a final text unanimously agreed, by the fourth Commission meeting in Hiroshima on 17-20 October 2009. The Commission will continue in existence until at least mid-2010, to enable follow-up advocacy on its report, and a review, after the 2010 NPT Review Conference, of the state of play and appropriate next steps.

A fuller account of how the Commission worked, and those who assisted it, may be found in Annex C of the full report, and at www.icnnd.org

Members of the Commission

Gareth Evans (Australia) (Co-chair)

Professor Evans was Australia's Resources and Energy Minister (1984-87) and Foreign Minister (1988-96). He initiated the Canberra Commission (1996) and was a member of the UN High-level Panel (2004), Blix Commission (2006) and Zedillo Commission on the IAEA (2008). He was President (2000-09) and is now President Emeritus of the International Crisis Group, and is currently the Chancellor of the Australian National University and an Honorary Professorial Fellow at the University of Melbourne.

Yoriko Kawaguchi (Japan) (Co-chair)

Ms Kawaguchi has been a Member of the House of Councillors for the Liberal Democratic Party since 2005. She was Special Adviser to the Prime Minister, responsible for foreign affairs (2004-05), Minister for Foreign Affairs (2002-04) and Minister for the Environment (2000-02). Previously she was a Managing

Director of Suntory Ltd, a senior official at the Ministry of International Trade and Industry, Minister at the Embassy of Japan to the United States, and an economist at the World Bank.

Turki Al Faisal (Saudi Arabia)

HRH Prince Turki was Director General of Intelligence from 1977 to 2001, and Ambassador to the United Kingdom and Ireland from 2002 to 2005, and to the United States from 2005 to 2007. He is currently Chairman of the Board of the King Faisal Center for Research and Islamic studies in Riyadh.

Alexei Arbatov (Russian Federation)

Dr Arbatov was a member of the Russian Duma and Deputy Chairman of the Duma Defence Committee from 1994 to 2003. He is currently a Scholar-in-Residence and Chair of the Non-proliferation Program at the Carnegie Moscow Center.

Gro Harlem Brundtland (Norway)

Dr Brundtland was Prime Minister of Norway for ten years between 1981 and 1996. She chaired the World Commission on Environment and Development (1987) and was Director General of the World Health Organization from 1998 to 2003. She is currently the UN Secretary-General's Special Envoy on Climate Change.

Frene Noshir Ginwala (South Africa)

Dr Ginwala was Speaker of South Africa's National Assembly from 1994 to 2004. She was Chancellor of the University of KwaZulu-Natal from 2004 until June 2009.

François Heisbourg (France)

Mr Heisbourg is Chairman of the International Institute for Strategic Studies and the Geneva Centre for Security Policy, and Special Adviser at the Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique, and was a member of the French Presidential Commission that produced the 2008 Defence and National Security White Paper.

Jehangir Karamat (Pakistan)

General Karamat was Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Chief of Army Staff between 1996 and 1998 and Pakistan's Ambassador to the United States from 2004 to 2006. He is currently Director of the Spearhead Research Institute.

Brajesh Mishra (India)

Mr Mishra was India's Ambassador in Geneva, Jakarta and then New York from 1973 to 1981, and National Security Adviser and Principal Secretary to former Indian Prime Minister A.B. Vajpayee from 1998 to 2004.

Klaus Naumann (Germany)

General Naumann was Chairman of the NATO Military Committee from 1996 to 1999 and Chief of the Defence Staff in Germany from 1991 to 1996. He was a Member of the Panel on UN Peace Operations (2000) and the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (2001).

William Perry (United States)

Dr Perry was the U.S. Secretary of Defense from 1994 to 1997. He is currently a Professor at Stanford University in the School of Engineering and the Institute for International Studies.

Wang Yingfan (China)

Ambassador Wang was China's Permanent Representative to the United Nations from 2000 to 2003, and Vice-Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Chinese National People's Congress from 2003 to 2008.

Shirley Williams (United Kingdom)

Baroness Williams was Leader of the Liberal Democrat Party in the House of Lords from 2001 to 2004. She is currently Professor Emeritus of the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University and an adviser to Prime Minister Gordon Brown on nuclear proliferation issues.

Wiryono Sastrohandoyo (Indonesia)

Ambassador Wiryono was Director General of Political Affairs in Indonesia's Department of Foreign Affairs from 1990-1993. He has served as Indonesia's Ambassador to Australia, France and Austria, as Permanent Representative to the UN in Vienna and on the Board of Governors for the IAEA.

Ernesto Zedillo (Mexico)

Dr Zedillo was President of Mexico from 1994 to 2000. He is currently Director of the Yale Center for the Study of Globalization, and Professor at Yale University in international economics.